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(1968–1998) of major utilities, we show that the fuel mix of electric utilities is
price inelastic. As a consequence, the implementation of a CO2 trading
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ingly, low-carbon fuels will hardly replace lignite and hard coal through CO2
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It is widely accepted that CO2 emissions are a potential threat to the world’s cli-
mate. While the debate on the appropriate instruments to reduce CO2 emissions
continues, the European Union has already agreed on implementing a CO2 trading
scheme. Permit trading is a cost-eﬃcient and, therefore, preferable policy instrument
from an economist’s perspective. Yet, there are serious concerns about the eﬀects
such a trading scheme might have on energy markets: hard coal and lignite, which are
responsible for roughly half of current German electricity generation, may lose their
competitiveness as a consequence of CO2 emissions trading.
Whether or not the use of coal and lignite is going to be aﬀected by CO2 abatement
is mainly determined by two factors: by the abatement target and the price sensitivity
of the utilities’ fuel demand. Obviously, the overall number of CO2 allowances will
determine the permit price and increase the costs of the various fuels proportionally to
their carbon content. As the second decisive factor, the sensitivity of the utilities’ fuel
demand with respect to fuel costs will ﬁnally determine the genuine pressure on fuels
due to CO2 trading. While the amount of permits being issued is purely a political
matter, the sensitivity of utilities to the price of fuel is a matter of factor demand and,
ultimately, a matter of production technology. This paper attempts to estimate fuel
price sensitivity in order to contribute to the assessment of the consequences of future
CO2 reduction policies.
The eﬀects that the fuel prices have on the fuel mix and interfuel substitution are a
wellestablished topic in the empirical literature. The majority of these papers, such as
those written by Griﬃn (1977), Pindyck (1979), Jones (1996), and S¨ oderholm (2000),
rely on highly aggregated data at the industry or national level. Such approaches,
however, appear to be questionable, since fuel mix decisions, involving investment
and factor demand decisions, are typically made at the ﬁrm-level. Using aggregate
data may not allow for modelling these complex decision problems at the micro-level;
nevertheless, although micro-econometric analyses of fuel-mix decisions are not absent
from the literature, almost all of these micro-level studies use data from US electric
utilities, see e.g. Atkinson & Halvorsen (1976), and Seiﬁ & McDonald (1986). Studies
using non-US ﬁrm-level data, such as Bousquet & Ivaldi (1998), are rare in this ﬁeld.
To this author’s best knowledge, only Tauchmann (2002) has analyzed German ﬁrm-
level data. While Tauchmann (2002) dealt with data predominantly originating from
small ﬁrms, this article focuses on the few major German utilities that represent the
electricity sector well.
2In order to predict the eﬀects of future price changes induced by emissions trading,
we must assume that ﬁrms in the electricity sector will not react to them in any
other way than they have reacted to any past fuel prices changes. Yet, the electricity-
generating sector in Germany has experienced various kinds of regulatory interventions
until recently. Therefore, this paper has to investigate whether price-induced interfuel
substitution can be identiﬁed in historic data at all. Additionally, we test whether
or not changes in the regulatory framework have directly aﬀected the fuel mix in this
sector. This question is particularly interesting since future CO2 emissions trading
will operate in an increasingly deregulated electricity market.
The following section describes the relevant institutional and regulatory framework.
Section 3 presents the model and its econometric speciﬁcation. Section 4 describes the
data, while Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Section 6.
2 The Regulatory Framework
The electric power-generating sector is one of the most extensively regulated German
industries. This can partially be explained by its history. When a comprehensive
national power system was installed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, regional
monopolies were granted to utilities. By guaranteing monopoly proﬁts, utilities were
motivated to bear the enormous investments in the required infrastructure. On the
other hand, prices were regulated and supervised, and utilities were obliged to provide
power to any consumer within a monopoly region. Even more relevant in the context
of this study is that not only the supply of electricity but also the production was
subjected to regulatory intervention.
Two reasons explain the energy mix in power generation attracted political inter-
vention. Firstly, German hard coal had been loosing its competitiveness on the world
market since the late 1950s. Secondly, after the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 oil supply
was regarded as unreliable. Consequently, increasing the use of hard coal in power gen-
eration became a corner stone of German and European energy policy, see S¨ oderholm
(1998). Since 1965, burning domestic hard coal has been subsidized. In 1974, the con-
struction of medium and large power plants burning gas or oil was subjected to oﬃcial
approval, and the use of gas in existing plants was restricted. Finally, in 1974, and
again in 1980, the German electricity producers were forced to burn ﬁxed quantities
of hard coal, for which they were compensated by an extra tax on electric power, the
so-called “Kohlepfennig”. Additionally, the employment of cheap coal from abroad
3was restricted. Parallel to the promotion of domestic coal, a nuclear power program
started in the 1960s. Research in nuclear energy technology was heavily subsidized and
numerous sites were built. Due to increasing inﬂuence of the anti-nuclear movement,
the construction of new nuclear power plants stopped. In fact, the last reactor went
into service in 1989.
In the 1990s, many regulations in power generation were relaxed or abandoned,
others were introduced. In 1994, the “Kohlepfennig” was dismissed by the German
supreme court. Even though German hard coal would still be subsidized, the scale of
subsides had substantially been reduced. The restrictions on the use of gas and oil
were abolished. The use of renewable energy has increasingly been promoted since
the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, the German government had been
trying to phaseout nuclear power since 1998. After intense negotiations in 2000 the
nuclear power industry agreed to phaseout of nuclear power by 2030 at the latest.
Finally, the EU agreed to liberalize the European electricity market in 1996. This
general deregulation program is likely to at least indirectly aﬀect fuel use decision of
electricity generating ﬁrms, see S¨ oderholm (1999).
3 Modelling Fuel Mix in Power Generation
Most econometric papers analyze the fuel mix in electric power generation on the basis
of cost or proﬁt function approaches, the standard tools of applied production analysis,
see e.g. Cowing & Smith (1978) or Considine (2000). Estimation results are often
provided in terms of structural parameters, such as elasticities of substitution.1 For
several reasons, though, one may doubt whether the structure of the data generating
process is correctly speciﬁed by standard proﬁt maximizing or cost minimizing models.
First of all, since electricity markets are often highly regulated, the ﬁrms’ optimization
problem is subject to many more restrictions than those given by market prices and
production technology. But even the assumption of given market prices may not be
appropriate: for instance, utilities burning lignite often operate their own mines.
Conventional speciﬁcations of the underlying production technology may also be
inappropriate. Firstly, static models do not catch speciﬁc features of the energy sector.
Since electricity can hardly be stored, the utility must meet the instantaneous demand
for power at any point in time at minimal costs. This issue has been intensely addressed
1One can dispute whether elasticities of substitution obtained from estimating standard –
e.g. translog – models are informative measures at all. Frondel & Schmidt (2002) show that such
estimates are almost exclusively determined by the sample means of cost-shares.
4in energy science research with particular focus on daily and yearly ﬂuctuations in
power demand. From an econometric point of view, the identiﬁcation of this complex
production structure requires a quasi-continuous observation of the key variables or at
least at many points in time. Yet, from the typically available quarterly, yearly, and
snapshot cross-section data, it seems to be impossible to identify the true structure of
the data generating process.2
3.1 The Modelling Strategy
Fuel substitution operates through quite diﬀerent pathways. In the long run, the
fuel mix is mainly determined by investments in diﬀerent production techniques that
use speciﬁc types of energy inputs. But even conditionally on existing production
capacities electricity producers can still adjust their energy demand patterns. Multi-
fuel burning boilers, for example, oﬀer a very direct way of replacing one type of fuel
with another. Mono-fuel plants also allow for substitution too, because a utility can
choose the activity level for diﬀerent mono-fuel plants that burn diﬀerent fuel types.
These distinct aspects could generally be integrated in a structural production model;
however, the data requirements are likely to be very high, and strong restrictions may
be necessary to identify the structural parameters.
Instead of a structural model, this study pursues a robust and simple non-structural
approach to identify eﬀects of price changes and regulatory interventions on the fuel
mix in German electric power generation. For simplicity, we assume that each type of
primary fuel is associated with a particular generation technique and use both terms
as synonyms. Obviously, this does not apply to multi-fuel burners. We cope with
this exceptional case by modelling “multi-fuel” as a separate generation technique, in
addition to fuel-speciﬁc ones.
Our model addresses the long-term as well as the short-term dimension of utilities’
fuel choice. Accordingly, an electricity producer’s fuel mix decision is described as
a two stage choice problem: In the ﬁrst stage a long-term investment decision must
be made about the capacities for each available generation technique3. In the second
2Stewart (1979) addresses this issue indirectly by arguing in favor of using multi-dimensional
output measures for electric utilities.
3With respect to investment, two further aspects might be distinguished: ﬁrstly, the discrete
decision about the pattern of techniques being used, and secondly the decision about the size of
capacities, given the chosen pattern. In fact, only a few papers have modelled discrete fuel choice,
e.g. Joskow & Mishkin (1977) and Ellis & Zimmerman (1982) an even smaller number has modelled
both aspects, see Seiﬁ & McDonald (1988) and Tauchmann (2000). Here, a somewhat diﬀerent
5stage, the amount of electricity actually generated by existing generation capacities
must be determined, representing a short-term production decision. We ﬁrstly focus
on the long-term dimension: While a structural modelling approach would lead to
a rather complex system of equations, we formulate a non-structural reduced form






lxit + υlit l =1 ,...,L. (1)
The index l denotes the respective generation technique, which also reﬂects a certain
fuel type; i stands for utility i, and index t indicates time. The parameter α
cap
li repre-
sents a utility-speciﬁc time-invariant eﬀect, υlit the usual error term. clit denotes the
fuel-speciﬁc generation capacities and xit the vector of explanatory variables. It is
assumed that the utilities adjust their capacities to changes in the exogenous variables
with some delay. Therefore, lagged values of the exogenous variables enter xit, where
t  <tholds. Besides fuel prices, for instance, the demand for electricity enters xit.
Additionally, time-speciﬁc indicators are included to capture changes in the regulatory
framework. All explanatory variables are discussed in detail in Section 4.
3.1.1 Stationarity
Standard unit-root tests reveal that neither the dependent nor the explanatory vari-
ables are stationary, while ﬁrst diﬀerences prove to be. In addition, joint panel unit
root tests, see Maddala & Wu (1999), cannot reject the null-hypothesis of these series
being jointly non-stationary for all utilities. In contrast, the same hypotheses are al-
ways rejected in the case of ﬁrst diﬀerences. Because of these test results, the model
is formulated in terms of ﬁrst diﬀerences rather than in levels4:




l∆xit +   υlit l =1 ,...,L. (2)
By taking this approach, we hope to avoid “spurious regression”, which might cause
misleading estimation results. In order to allow for utility-speciﬁc drifts, individual
eﬀects5 are retained in the reformulated model (2).
approach is taken by explaining changes in capacities rather than capacities themselves, which may
reﬂect either aspects of investment. See Section 3.1.3 for details.
4This approach is not free from measurement error problems, which are also a potential cause for
bias and to be present in the data. The problem gets more severe if ﬁrst diﬀerences or ﬁxed eﬀects
are used, see Griliches & Hausman (1986). However, this does not apply in the case of autocorrelated
measurement error, see Bound & Krueger (1991).
5Combining ﬁrst diﬀerences with ﬁxed eﬀects may cause problems, since this removes a large share
63.1.2 Time Structure of Regressors
It is obvious that electricity-generating capacities react to changes in fuel prices with
some delay. Because of long planning and construction periods, which are typical for
power plants, a lag of just one year is certainly too short. Furthermore, the very
recent past might be of very limited relevance, since ﬁrms cannot adjust their ongoing
investments projects immediately. To allow for such a time lag structure within a
“distributed lag” framework, the log-normal density serves as weighting function. In
contrast, geometrically distributed lags, the most common approach, force the eﬀect
of changes in the explanatory variables to constantly fade away over time. Depending
on the parameters µl and σl of the log-normal distribution, which are subject to
estimation, the choice of a log-normal weighting function ωlj allows for small weights
on the recent past as well as the far past, while heavy weights can be allocated to the
periods in between. Correspondingly, (2) can be reformulated as




l  xlit +   υlit with   xlit =
J  
j=1
ωlj (j,µl,σ l)∆xi(t−j). (3)
Obviously, the loss of many observations through the inclusion of numerous lags ne-
cessitates to restrict the number of lags. The actually chosen value, J = 9, represents
a compromise of theory and data requirements.
3.1.3 A Discrete Model of Capacity Change
Besides non-stationarity, the data show another characteristic feature. Capacities
change rarely, but spasmodically, and thus exhibit a discrete as well as continuous
aspect of capacity adjustment. The discrete decision whether to extend, reduce, or
leave capacities unchanged can be captured by a standard ordered choice model. Cor-
respondingly, the following notation is chosen:




1 if ∆clit > 0
0 if ∆clit =0
−1 if ∆clit < 0.
(4)
Assuming the   υlit to be normally distributed, the likelihood function for the resulting
of variation, which in turn cannot be employed for the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects. In an untypical
panel, i.e large T but small N, as it is in our case, this problem is less severe than for typical panels.
7ordered probit model can be written as follows:
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2((∆ clit)2+∆ clit) .
The likelihood function explains the probability that an extension, a reduction or
an unchanged capacity type l is observed. Threshold parameters are denoted by θl.
Individual eﬀects   α
cap
li are speciﬁed as ﬁxed, rather than random. The “incidental
parameters problem” is irrelevant in our context, since N is very small in comparison
with T. Therefore, N-consistency cannot be a relevant criterion. For those ﬁrms
with no capacities for a certain fuel, the model has to be modiﬁed slightly. Here, the
model is reduced to a simple binary choice problem with the alternatives “extending
capacities” and “leaving them unchanged”:
Pr
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Because of enormous numerical problems due to the simultaneous estimation of a
system of ordered probit models, we have ignored the correlation of the error terms
  υlit across the fuel type equations and have separately estimated ordered probit models.
In principle, in a second step, the continuous aspect of capacity adjustment could be
explained on basis of a linear a regression that only accounts for those observations for
which ∆clit  = 0 holds. However, ignoring observations that do not exhibit adjustment
in capacities is likely to cause a typical sample selection problem. This problem could
be addressed by a generalized Heckman-correction. Yet, since capacities are adjusted
infrequently, the sample that could be used for this second-step analysis would be
rather small. For this reason, we abstain from adding the second step and restrict the
analysis to the discrete aspect.
3.2 A Continuous Model of Electricity Generation
Analogous to (1), a model explaining electricity generation by diﬀerent fuels, given





lzit + εlit,l =1 ,...,L. (7)
8Here, ylit denotes the amount of electricity that is generated by utility i using fuel type
l in period t. The model is formulated in logs rather than levels. Large diﬀerences in
the utilities’ size are a strong argument in favor of expressing marginal price eﬀects in
terms of elasticities. The vector zit shares most of its elements with xit, except for gen-
eration capacities that are additionally included, since electricity generation depends
on existing capacities. We distinguish between “speciﬁc” capacities clit, i.e. capacities
for burning fuel l, and “unspeciﬁc” ones clit ≡ cit − clit, i.e. capacities for burning
fuels others than l. Choosing the fuel mix conditionally on existing generation capac-
ities is a matter of short term factor demand. Accordingly, contemporaneous rather
than lagged values of explanatory variables enter zit. The intercept α
gen
li captures
unobserved time-invariant and utility-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
3.2.1 Speciﬁcation and Estimation
The series for fuel-speciﬁc electricity generation proved to be non-stationary. Corre-
spondingly, the generation model is formulated in ﬁrst diﬀerences, too. Unfortunately,
by solely focusing on ﬁrst diﬀerences, any information on possible long-term stationary
equilibrium relationships between dependent and explanatory variables that might be
comprised in the data is given away. Error-correction models, see e.g. Hamilton (1994),
provide the opportunity to capture short-term relationships in ﬁrst diﬀerences as well
as long-term ones concerning the levels of variables. In our context, such long-term
equilibrium relationships seem to be plausible at least between generation capacities
and electricity generation. To test whether such co-integrating relationships can actu-
ally be found, Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) tests were applied. In the overwhelming number
of series, these tests could not support the hypothesis of co-integrating relationships
being present. Therefore, an error-correction model is not speciﬁed, and the model is





l∆zit +   εlit,l =1 ,...,L. (8)
To allow for utility-speciﬁc drifts, individual eﬀects   α
gen
li were even included in the
diﬀerenced model and were estimated as ﬁxed eﬀects. In contrast to the non-linear
model (5), cross-equation correlation of the   εlit can easily be accounted for in the linear
model framework used here. Therefore, the coeﬃcients of the linear system (8) are si-
multaneously estimated using the SURE-method, see Zellner (1963). Varying patterns
of fuel types used – i.e. an observation-speciﬁc number of equations in the system –
are accounted for by adequately correcting the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
Bootstrapping was applied to obtain standard errors for the estimated coeﬃcients.
94T h e D a t a
Econometric analyses with German ﬁrm-level data are extremely rare, since such data
are hardly available the public in Germany. The micro-data on German electric utilities
used here were collected by the “Association of German Power Plants” (VDEW). The
VDEW data comprise annual information on almost all electricity producers at the
ﬁrm and plant level since the 1950s, speciﬁcally on capacities, peak loads, electricity
output and losses, and the structure of the demand side within the monopoly regions.
Our analysis is concentrated on the period from 1968 to 19986. We restrict our
attention to only nine electric utilities7, which dominated the German electricity mar-
ket before its liberalization initiated. These monopolies were the largest8 electricity
producers, in terms of generation capacities as well as actual electricity generation.
In 1995 they held a share of 65% in overall German generation capacities and 70% in
electricity generation.
Since utility-speciﬁc price data are not available, aggregated data are used, pro-
vided by the OECD, the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, and the “Statistics of Coal
Economics”9. Therefore, our approach is not purely based on micro-data. Mergers of
utilities as well as the restructuring of existing ﬁrms – e.g. the reallocation of busi-
ness domains to subsidiary companies – appear as physical rather than organizational
changes in the data. Wherever possible, the data were corrected for such eﬀects. More-
over, power plants jointly held by several utilities are not reported in the data prior
to 1975. For this reason, our panel is unbalanced.
In addition to “multi-fuel”10, six fuel types are distinguished in our analysis: coal,
lignite, gas, oil, nuclear power, and “others”. The residual category “others” comprises
several primary energy sources – primarily water power but also waste, wind and, solar
power – all of which are relevant in the context of CO2 abatement. However, each
individual energy sources is of marginal importance.
6Even though a more recent wave has recently been published, the new data are hardly comparable
due to the process of mergers in the German power sector.
7In detail, these utilities are: RWE, PreussenElektra, Bayernwerk, VEW, Badenwerk AG, En-
ergieversorgung Schwaben AG (EVS), Bewag, Hamburgische Electricit¨ atswerke (HEW), and VEAG,
called the “Verbundunternehmen”. Only four major utilities still exist: RWE took over VEW;
PreussenElectra and Bayernwerk merged to E.ON; Energieversorgung Schwaben and Badenwerk
merged to EnBW; and Vattenfall Europe took over Bewag, HEW, and VEAG.
8In fact, a small number of large producers does not belong to this group of utilities.
9Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft e.V.
10Since “multi-fuel” is an generation technique and not fuel itself, this category is relevant only for
generation capacities, but not for generation.
104.1 Generation Capacities
The development of fuel-speciﬁc capacities belonging to the nine dominating utilities
can roughly be described as follows: The traditional dominance of lignite even in-
creased as a consequence of German reuniﬁcation, reﬂecting the fact that electricity
is predominately generated from lignite in East Germany. The importance of gas
has been declining since the 1970s; however, it seemed to recover in the late 1990s.
Throughout the entire period, oil was of marginal importance. The relative importance
of nuclear power rapidly increased up to the mid 1980s. Then the installed capacities
for nuclear power remained constant. Finally, hard coal capacities were enlarged from
the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, thereafter they declined marginally.
Generation capacities are far from being evenly distributed across utilities. First of
all, capacities substantially diﬀer in size. For example, in 1995, the largest utility by
far, RWE, held a share of 28.9% in total capacities, 17.9% and 18.7% were the shares
of PreussenElektra and VEAG respectively, while those of all others utilities were
substantially smaller. Similarly, fuel-speciﬁc capacities were also unevenly distributed.
In particular, RWE and VEAG were dominant with respect to capacities for burning
lignite. In fact, the majority of the remaining ﬁrms did not endure such capacities at
all. Furthermore, gas capacities were concentrated on RWE and VEW.11
4.2 Electricity Generation
Total generation of all nine utilities constantly increased during the period in question.
The period up to the mid 1980s was characterized by the expansion of nuclear power.
Since the mid 1970s, generation from hard coal had also gained in absolute terms as
well as relative terms. Generation from gas and oil had dramatically been reduced
since the mid 1970s; however, it looks as though the use of gas has recovered in
recent years. All other primary energy sources have only played a marginal role. The
allocation of generation to the diﬀerent fuels highly coincides with the distribution
of fuel-speciﬁc capacities. Correspondingly, utilities’ size diﬀer similarly in terms of
generation diﬀered as in terms of capacities.12
11Considering all nine major utilities jointly, in 1995, both nuclear and lignite power plants ac-
counted for 27.9%, while hard coal, gas, oil und other mono-fuel plants accounted for 9.7%, 5.7%,
6.7%, and for 6.9% of total capacities, respectively. The remaining 15.2% are multi-fuel plants.
12Considering all nine major utilities jointly, in 1995, nuclear power received a share of 37.5%, in
electricity generation, while lignite accounted for 37.1%, hard coal for 19.6%, gas for 2.7%, oil for
0.7%, and ﬁnally other fuels for 2.4% of total generation.
114.3 Explanatory Variables
Aggregated fuel prices13 are plotted in Figure 1, with electricity serving as nummeraire.
The two oil crises in the 1970s shape the series, whereas oil and gas are much more
aﬀected than coal or lignite. Moreover, oil and gas prices are more volatile than coal
or lignite prices. Unfortunately, fuel prices, especially those of oil and gas14, are highly
correlated, and this hampers the econometric analysis.
An optimal fuel mix is likely to be determined by the load demand curve, see section
3, which is not directly observed in our data. Nevertheless, the corresponding “load
factor” LFit
15 is included in the vectors xit and zit. It is deﬁned as the actual demand
for electricity dit, divided by the demand that would have been accrued if the demand
for electric load had stood at its peak PL it for the hole year, i.e. 8760 hours:
LFit ≡
dit
8760 ∗ PL it
.
The load factor is a non-dimensional variable, normalized to the unit-interval. Values
close to one indicate an evenly distributed load demand, while values closed to zero
indicate an unevenly distributed one. In the pooled sample, LFit takes an average of
0.66. Along with the demand for electricity dit, this variable characterizes the demand
side within the utilities’ regional monopolies.
Including a full set of time dummies is not operational, because time dummies and
aggregated prices are highly correlated. Therefore, only one time-dependent dummy
variable is included in the model. It takes the value one for the periods 1995 – 1998 and
zero otherwise. This dummy can be interpreted as a deregulation indicator, capturing
the eﬀects of somewhat relaxed regulation of electricity production since the mid 1990s.
13Reliable price measures for nuclear fuel were not available. Some other generation techniques,
namely wind and waterpower, have no variable fuel costs at all. Some speciﬁcations additionally
consider costs of labor and capital. Unfortunately, only weak proxies for ﬁrm- and technique-speciﬁc
costs were available. Moreover, the corresponding coeﬃcients turned out to be insigniﬁcant. For this
reason, results for these speciﬁcations are not presented.
14This might be explained by long-term contracts, which often peg the price of gas to the price of
oil.
15The use of the load factor used as a regressor in an econometric analysis was introduced by
S¨ oderholm (2001).
12Figure 1: Relative prices of fossil fuels
Source: Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft e.V. and own calculations
5 Estimation Results
Tables 1 and 3 display estimation results for the discrete capacity change model and
the continuous generation model, respectively. Raw coeﬃcients rather than marginal
eﬀects are presented, since our discussion focuses on signiﬁcance and direction of ef-
fects. Additionally, Tables 2 and 4 display test results concerning the joint signiﬁcance
of groups of variables, such as prices, within single equations. Finally, Table 5 presents
results concerning joint signiﬁcance of individual explanatory variables across equa-
tions.
13Table 1: Capacities model: estimated parameters












Pr. Elektra –– 1.756∗
(0.862) ––– 2.375∗∗
(0.620)
VEAG –– – ––– –





























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.
145.1 Results for the Capacities Model
Fixed eﬀects are only jointly signiﬁcant for gas and multi-fuel. So, for the other genera-
tion techniques, Table 1 presents the results originating from speciﬁcations including a
uniform constant. The log-normal weighting function’s parameters σl and µl typically
indicate a pronounced delay in the adaptation of capacities in response to changes in
the exogenous variables, with oil and “other fuels” being the only exceptions from this
rule. This result appears to be plausible, since the latter two techniques are typically
characterized by small installations. The still rather moderate eﬀect that the very dis-
tant past has on capacities for burning lignite, coal, and nuclear fuel comes somewhat
as a surprise, since these techniques are characterized by very large plants, implying
long planning and construction periods.
The load factor as well as the demand for electricity does not explain ﬁrms’ invest-
ment behavior. For the load factor, none of the corresponding coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant.
That is, the evenness of electricity demand does not seem to have any eﬀects on utili-
ties’ investment decisions. Electricity demand has a signiﬁcant eﬀect only in the case
of lignite; however, it bears a negative, i.e. the “wrong”, sign. Therefore, there is
no support for the hypothesis that utilities react to changes in electricity demand by
adjusting their capacities for electricity generation.
Similarly, the estimated price eﬀects do not suggest that fuel prices are decisive
for utilities’ fuel-speciﬁc investment decisions. A signiﬁcant overall price eﬀect cannot
be recognized at all in the cases of lignite, gas, and multi-fuel, see Table 2. In the
equations concerning the remaining fuels, prices are jointly signiﬁcant, and the own-
price eﬀects are also signiﬁcant, except for gas. However, these eﬀects often bear the
“wrong”, i.e. positive, sign. Only for oil we do obtain the expected result, which is
that the propensity to invest in oil-ﬁred power plants is reduced by rising oil prices.
Table 2: Capacities model: joint signiﬁcance
coal lignite gas oil nuclear others multi-fuel
ﬁxed eﬀects 0.968 0.320 0.001 0.911 0.853 0.812 0.004
prices 0.000 0.081 0.509 0.025 0.001 0.003 0.511
Note: p-values for Wald-tests
The “deregulation indicator” is signiﬁcant – and positive – only in the case of lignite.
For this ﬁnding, it is hard to ﬁnd an appealing explanation, because prior to 1995,
lignite was less regulated than any other fuel.
15Table 3: Generation model: estimated parameters
















































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.
5.2 Results for the Electricity Generation Model
Fixed eﬀects are never signiﬁcant. Furthermore, constants are also insigniﬁcant, with
the equation for lignite being the only exception. Therefore, except for lignite, results
for speciﬁcations without constant terms are presented.
Only a few estimated coeﬃcients are individually signiﬁcant, with speciﬁc capacities
for burning gas, oil, and “other fuels” being among the signiﬁcant ones. Moreover, the
null-hypothesis that a one percent change in these capacities leads to a one percent
change in electricity generated by them cannot be rejected. In contrast, no signiﬁcant
eﬀects of capacities on the corresponding generation can be found in the case of lignite,
nuclear power, and coal.
Individual unspeciﬁc capacities do not seem to have any eﬀect. Jointly, however,
i.e. by taking all six equations simultaneously into account, they are as signiﬁcant as
the speciﬁc ones. This leads us to conclude that the rather trivial hypothesis that
16existing generation capacities have an eﬀect on the amount of electricity generated by
them is weakly supported. Detailed insights on how changes in capacities aﬀect the
allocation of electricity production to diﬀerent fuels, however, can hardly be inferred
from our estimation results.
Similarly, the demand for electricity shows individually no eﬀects, with the equation
for coal being the only exception. Nevertheless, demand is jointly signiﬁcant, see Table
5. In the cases of oil and coal, the load factor shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect, but estimated
signs do not appear to stay in line with theory. Surprisingly, with respect to the
canonical base load techniques (lignite and less pronounced coal) as well as their peak
load counterpart (gas) no eﬀects of the load factor can be recognized. Therefore, the
importance of the load factor on the fuel choice seems to be rather weak. By jointly
considering all six equations, its eﬀect sails on the margin of statistical signiﬁcance.
Table 4: Generation: joint signiﬁcance within single equations
coal lignite gas oil nuclear others
ﬁxed eﬀects 0.898 0.285 0.813 0.811 0.472 0.755
constant 0.418 0.008 0.949 0.495 0.582 0.996
prices 0.210 0.720 0.951 0.028 0.315 0.418
Note: p-values for Wald-tests
The deregulation indicator displays signiﬁcant eﬀects only for lignite and oil. With
respect to lignite, the downward trend apparently came to an end in 1995. This
might reﬂect the political protection that East German lignite has received in recent
years. With respect to oil, the estimated negative sign cannot easily be explained by
deregulation. Simultaneously examining all six equations, joint insigniﬁcance of the
deregulation indicators can just marginally be rejected. Therefore, a clear-cut eﬀect of
power sector deregulation on utilities’ conditional fuel mix cannot be recognized yet.
Considering fuel prices, the hypothesis that there is no price eﬀect at all – i.e. any
price coeﬃcient in any equation is equal to zero – cannot be rejected. The correspond-
ing p-value is as high as 0.368. Moreover, examining each equation separately cannot
contribute much evidence for rejecting the null-hypothesis either. The equation for
electricity generation by oil turns out to be the only one that displays jointly sig-
niﬁcant price coeﬃcients, see Table 4. Additionally, this equation shows individually
signiﬁcant prices alone, though the direct price eﬀect is not among the signiﬁcant ones.
Therefore, no evidence is found in the data that supports the hypothesis that fuel-mix
decisions, given existing capacities, are determined by prices of fossil fuels.
17Table 5: Generation: joint signiﬁcance across equations
Wald-Statistic p-value
speciﬁc capacities 66.731 0.000
unspeciﬁc capacities 14.715 0.023
price coal 10.414 0.108
price lignite 6.522 0.367
price gas 13.358 0.038
price oil 5.903 0.434
demand 28.259 0.000
load factor 12.987 0.043
deregulation indicator 12.821 0.046
5.3 Interpretation of Estimation Results
Persuasive evidence that fuel prices are pivotal determinants of utilities’ fuel choice
could not be found, neither in the case of generation capacities nor the case of elec-
tricity generation. This result might be explained by high regulatory pressure, making
fuel choice a political matter rather than one of cost minimization and business man-
agement. If this interpretation is correct, it will appear to be a rather ambitious task
to draw any conclusions about a less regulated future from estimation results that
are based on data concerning a highly regulated past, especially, these estimation re-
sults were of limited use for predicting the future impact of CO2 emissions trading on
electric utilities’ fuel mix.
Nevertheless, if by our estimation results technology, not regulation, is reﬂected,
these results indicate that changing the fuel mix is a rather expansive CO2 abatement
measure. If this is the case, utilities’ fuel choice will hardly react to a carbon reduction
enforced by a cap on CO2 emissions, and carbon abatement will operate through other
channels.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, the attempt has been made to estimate the eﬀects of fuel prices on the
German utilities’ fuel choice through the use of German ﬁrm-level data. Such estimates
are required to predict the impact the scheduled European CO2 trading may have on
the fuel mix used for electricity generation. Estimation results do not indicate that
in the past utilities have adjusted their fuel choice to changes in fuel prices, either
18in terms of fuel-speciﬁc combustion capacities or in terms of fuel use, given existing
capacities.
During the period from 1968 to 1998, the German electricity market was subjected
to various regulatory interventions. Recently, many of these regulations have been
either relaxed or abolished. Therefore the estimated low fuel price sensitivity that
might be due to past regulation may not tell much about future price eﬀects induced
by future CO2 emissions markets.
If the insigniﬁcance of price eﬀects is due to technological reasons rather than gov-
ernment intervention in the electricity markets, our estimation results indicate that
prices of CO2 permits may have no severe eﬀects on utilities’ fuel choice. Most impor-
tantly, high-carbon fuels like lignite and coal may still be used intensively under an
emissions-trading regime.
In any case, more information is required about utilities, operating within a less
regulated environment, in order to decide whether the future fuel mix will be as price
inelastic as the past one and whether severe changes in the fuel mix have to be expected
in the course of the European CO2 allowance market.
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